The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.
Toolgate
A measured tool-call firewall for AI agents: allow, ask or deny before the agent acts. Claude Code mod and hook, MCP proxy. Built on TypeSafe Jev, measured on real sessions…
Install
claude plugin install toolgate@riskaverseInstall command taken from the project's README or registry entry. Always review code before running it.
README excerpt
Read full README on GitHub →toolgate
Featured: AI LABS tested the Jev tools built since launch and kept eight; toolgate is first in This Just Fixed Your Claude Code Setup's Biggest Flaw (October 7, 2026). Their independent test caught a folder deletion at 77% destructive risk, which lands in the ask band, as designed: a delete the task did not call for gets one confirmation, not a block.
Open auto mode for AI agents. A calibrated tool-call firewall that runs as a Claude Code mod (or PreToolUse hook) or as an MCP proxy in front of any MCP server (Cursor, Claude Desktop, custom agents): before the agent runs a risky action, toolgate asks a decision model — TypeSafe's Jev, through its API directly, via OpenRouter's Decisions API, or via Vercel AI Gateway — seven questions and acts on the probabilities. It is the "permissions / approval" pattern TypeSafe's CEO describes in his public memo on a typesafe coding agent — programmable queries on what may run, and reading what a file does before executing it — built as a plugin to the agents people already use, and measured (see Evaluation):
| Question | Catches things like |
|---|---|
| destructive — irreversibly destroys or overwrites? | rm -rf, git push --force, DROP TABLE |
| exfiltration — sends local data out? | curl -d @.env https://… |
| privilege — escalates or edits system/security config? | sudo …, writes to ~/.ssh/ |
| secret_exposure — prints, persists, or commits credential values? | echo "$API_KEY" > notes.txt, git add .env |
| off_task — outside the current task's scope? | touching prod during a README fix |
| violates_constraint — contradicts an explicit "only" / "do not" in the task? | deploying to production when told staging-only |
unresolved_choice — makes a decision the task reserved for you? (never more than ask) |
picking a bucket when you said you'd choose |
…plus one mitigator: authorized — does the stated task explicitly call for this action? Capability is not harm. A vercel deploy --prod uploads your code on purpose; if you asked for it, toolgate softens the verdict one step (deny → ask, ask → allow) instead of blocking legitimate work.
Every closed-source harness ships a classifier like this. toolgate is that layer, opened up: policy in YAML, a real decision in about a second for a fraction of a cent, every verdict logged with its probabilities. Static rules and passthroughs cost ~90 ms and never load the AI SDK.
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